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The Rationality Requirement of the
Equal Protection Clause
GARY C. LEEDES *
I. TOWARDS A MEANS-FOCUSED JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE
CLASSIFICATIONS
A. Introduction
This Article discusses the rationality requirement of the Equal Protection
Clause' as applied by the Supreme Court of the United States. Although the
rationality requirement has come under increasing attack by scholars,2 it has
been used by the Supreme Court as the test in equal protection cases for over
a century. The rationality requirement permits a court to intercede on behalf
of a litigant challenging the constitutionality of a statute if the court deter-
mines that the challenged disadvantageous classification is not rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest. The purpose of the rationality
requirement is to prevent arbitrary discrimination.4
In part I of this Article I will briefly trace the evolution of the Court's
equal protection doctrine in order to point out how it began as a relatively
modest, somewhat ends-oriented method of analysis' and developed into
"toothless scrutiny' 6 in economic regulation cases until the Burger Court
• Prof. of Law, University of Richmond. B.S.E., Pennsylvania, 1960; L.L.B. Temple, 1962; L.L.M.,
Harvard, 1973. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his student, Roger Cotner.
1. This Article discusses the minimum standard of judicial review that is applicable if legislation is
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment. There is no extensive discussion of
strict scrutiny, the intermediate level of scrutiny, or the sliding scale approach. The focus is on the Court's most
deferential equal protection standard. This Article does not discuss the minimum standard of review that is
applicable when legislation is challenged under the Due Process Clause. For an extremely valuable and more
general discussion of the rationality requirement, see Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Bice].
2. See, e.g., Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Linde];
Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023 (1979) [herein-
after cited as Perry].
3. See Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879).
4. Id. at 29-33. In Jones v. Helms, 101 S. Ct. 2434 (1981), the Court reiterated the familiar principle that
"[t]he Equal Protection Clause provides a basis for challenging legislative classifications that treat one group of
persons as inferior or superior to others, and for contending that general rules are being applied in an arbitrary or
discriminatory way." Id. at 2442 (footnotes omitted). The Court cited the statement made by Senator Howard in
the Senate debate preceding the adoption of the fourteenth amendment to illuminate the scope of the guarantee:
This abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste
of persons to a code not applicable to another .... It establishes equality before the law, and it gives
to the humblest, the poorest, the most despised of the race the same rights and the same protection
before the law as it gives to the most powerful, the most wealthy, or the most haughty. That, sir, is
republican government as I understand it, and the only one which can claim the praise of a Just
Government.
Id. at 2442 n.23 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866)).
5. See text accompanying notes 27-37 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 38-48 infra.
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managed to put a little more bite into the means-focused aspects of the
rationality requirement.7 Part I culminates with a dicussion of three
significant cases decided during the 1980 Term,8 namely, Schweiker v. Wilson,9
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 0  and United States Railroad
Retirement Board v. Fritz." These recent cases disclose that several
Justices are no longer prepared to defer excessively to the legislature's clas-
sifications when the legislature does not identify its purposes. This is a signifi-
cant shift, a departure from the minimum rationality test of the
Warren Court period, which amounted to a meaningless ritual.
In part II, I argue that the rationality requirement, properly understood,
does not apply in every equal protection case. There are occasions when the
legislature should have discretion to indulge in unalloyed favoritism or anti-
pathy towards certain groups that are singled out by the elected representa-
tives. 12 Accepting some of the legislature's biases, I argue, is a lesser evil
than hypothesizing some legitimate purpose not considered by the legislature
in order to justify classifications that discriminate against certain groups.
The Court often should condone the legislature's biases, which are under-
standable as expressions of taste, aesthetics, 4 or inarticulable evaluations of
worth. Many biases are not amenable to evaluation by a rationality test.
Unless the Court exercises restraint in such situations, it will be substituting
its tastes, and imposing its likes and dislikes on elected legislators who should
be representative, which is not the same as impartial."' Most legislative clas-
sifications, however, should be subjected to meaningful but deferential
scrutiny under the rational basis test, which I refer to as the rationality re-
quirement.
Tussman and tenBroek's seminal article 16 describes how the rationality
requirement came to be used as an intermediate premise17 designed by the
judiciary to implement the Equal Protection Clause. Laws classify, they
remind us, and the very idea of classification is that of inequality." "In
tackling this paradox the Court has neither abandoned the demand for equal-
7. See text accompanying notes 49-73 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 74-176 infra.
9. 101 S. Ct. 1074 (1981).
10. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
11. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
12. See text accompanying notes 190-99 infra.
13. See text accompanying notes 193-219 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 214-15 infra. In Metromedia, Inc., v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882
(1981), the Court in a first amendment case involving commercial speech discussed in instrumental terms the
extent to which a restriction on billboard advertising directly advanced a city's interests in aesthetics. It is
awkward, if not always inappropriate, for a court to apply instrumental tests, like the rationality requirement, to
determine which classifications do or do not contribute to beauty.
15. Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
16. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949) [hereinafter
cited as Tussman & tenBroek].
17. Mediating principles are derived from the Constitution's general principles and "give meaning and
content to an ideal embodied in the text." Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY &
PUB. AFF. 107, 107 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Fiss].
18. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 16, at 344; see also Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 154
(1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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ity nor denied the legislative right to classify. It has taken a middle course." 9
The Court insists on a reasonable classification. The essence of the concept,
"reasonable classification," is "that those who are similarly situated [must]
be similarly treated." 20 In order to decide if persons or classes are similarly
situated, it is necessary to look to the purpose of the law.
Once the purpose of the law is ascertained, the Court returns to the
classification to decide if it is reasonable. The essence of a classification is the
legislature's use of a trait selected as a proxy for an individual's characteris-
tics or tendencies. Statutory classifications eliminate the need for case by case
determinations. Thus, age sixteen is a trait used in a statute to denote an
individual's immaturity and inability to drive safely. Although use of a clas-
sification is thought to be more efficient than a series of individualized deter-
minations, almost all classifications are overinclusive or underinclusive. 2' In
other words, the use of a trait as a proxy usually is an inaccurate generaliza-
tion.Y2 To the extent that the legislature's target group is immature motor
vehicle operators unable to drive safely, its classification is underinclusive
since not all such operators are under age sixteen; to the extent that some
juveniles burdened by the statute are mature enough to drive safely, the
classification is overinclusive. If the Court decides that the classification is
intolerably overinclusive or underinclusive and therefore unacceptably
imprecise, it will sustain a challenge based on equal protection principles. 
2
There are many problems associated with the rationality requirement.
One ever-present danger is judicial usurpation of the legislative role. In this
regard, the Supreme Court has always recognized that the Equal Protection
Clause is not
designed to interfere with the power of the State, sometimes termed its police
power, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education,
and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the
State, develop its resources, and add to its wealth and prosperity.
24
Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid all discrimination
among persons or classes, 25 nor does it prohibit "[s]pecial burdens.., often
necessary for general benefits.,
26
19. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 16, at 344.
20. Id.
21. A classification "could be overinclusive (it picked out more persons than it should) or underinclusive (it
excluded persons that it should not)." Fiss, supra note 17, at I11.
22. "Whether a classification actually serves the governmental interest is a question of fact. Because
legislatures are generally more competent to resolve complex empirical questions than courts, the
Supreme Court insists only that the empirical judgment implicit in the legislature's use of the classifica-
tion-namely, that the classification will or might serve the governmental interest-be rational or
plausible."
Perry, supra note 2, at 1068 n.232 (citation omitted).
23. Whether a classification is overinclusive or underinclusive, or intolerably imprecise, is a question of
degree requiring judicial judgment. The courts recognize, however, that "[t]he problems of government are
practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations." Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City
of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69 (1913).
24. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
25. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1879).
26. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
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B. Towards Meaningful Judicial Review, Neither Unduly
Deferential nor Intrusive
Although the Equal Protection Clause is not a warrant to usurp the legis-
lative function, some early formulations of the rationality requirement were
not toothless. In Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Ellis,27 the Court
invalidated a statute that required railroad companies to pay the attorney fees
of successful plainfiffs after explaining the classifications "must always rest
upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in
respect to which the classification is proposed, and can never be made arbi-
trarily." 28 In accordance with the rationality requirement, the Court empha-
sized that a classification could be arbitrary for some legislative purposes, but
not others. Thus, a railroad company may be regulated peculiarly if it creates
peculiar safety hazards,29 but it may not be isolated when the state simply
aims to prevent unnecessary litigation. No difference between railroad
companies and other companies justifies this special restriction.0 Perhaps the
legislature believed that the railroads were unfairly forcing injured plaintiffs to
litigate. The Court refused, however, to entertain this possibility in the
absence of evidence and held that the challenged statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause.
During the early twentieth century, the Court was torn between its desire
to supervise the states' exercise of the police power and its professed desire
not to displace the legislature's judgment. The solution was to place the
burden of persuasion on the challenger in an equal protection case. The Court
required one who assailed a classification to "carry the burden of showing
that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.'
By 1920, however, a rationality standard had evolved that insisted that the
means selected have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be
obtained.32 An elaborate statement of equal protection principles was articu-
lated by Chief Justice Taft in Truax v. Corrigan.33 In Truax, the Court invali-
dated a state law which specifically exempted ex-employees, when commit-
ting tortious and irreparable injury to the business of their former employer,
from restraint by injunction. The law left subject to such restraint all other
tortfeasors engaged in like wrongdoing. Chief Justice Taft wrote that classifi-
cations "must regard real resemblances and real differences between things,
and persons, and class them in accordance with their pertinence to the
purpose at hand.'' 34 He went on to say that classifications like the one chal-
lenged in Truax cannot be upheld as legalized experiments in sociology
27. 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
28. Id. at 155.
29. Id. at 157-58.
30. Id. at 159.
31. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 79 (1911) (citations omitted).
32. F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
33. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
34. Id. at 338.
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because the very purpose of the Constitution was to prevent experimentation
with the fundamental rights of the individual a5 Justice Brandeis, dissenting,
complained that the Court ignored the facts which justified the legislature's
distinction. Pointing out that "[r]esort to... facts is necessary... in order
to appreciate the evils sought to be remedied and the possible effects of the
remedy proposed,"-36 Justice Brandeis, as he so often did, admonished the
Court "not to declare a rule arbitrary and unreasonable merely because we
are convinced that it is fraught with danger to the public weal, and thus to
close the door to experiment within the law."
37
During the first third of the twentieth century, it became increasingly
evident that the Supreme Court could not resist substituting its subjective
judgment for that of the legislature in the name of the rationality requirement.
Built into the rationality requirement is an invitation for courts to engage in an
intrusive ends inquiry, and when courts accept this invitation, they read into
the Constitution their own notions of public policy. After 1937, the Supreme
Court recognized the error of its ways. Although the most objectionable
abuses of judicial power had occurred in connection with the doctrine of
substantive due process, the Justices also became highly deferential to legisla-
tive judgment when a statute was assailed under the Equal Protection Clause.
During the mid-twentieth century, the judiciary adopted a stance that
made challengers relying on equal protection principles dread the thought of
what had become "minimum rationality." Under one frequently repeated
formulation of the rational basis test, "statutory classifications will be set
aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them, 318 and will not be
set aside "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify" the
discrimination.39 In cases involving state regulation of business practices,
mere administrative convenience justified discrimination. 40 Thus, the means
scrutiny of the Court was rendered impotent. Under the Warren Court's
extremely deferential formulations, statutory classifications were invalidated
only if shown to be "based on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit' 0, of
some conceivably legitimate end-whether or not that end was in fact con-
sidered by the legislature.42 In other words, "If no facts could reasonably be
conceived to make legislation a rational way to serve its actual purpose, an
imagined purpose would surely suffice." 43 Thus, the ends scrutiny com-
ponent of the rationality requirement was eliminated, and means scrutiny
imposed no real constraint.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 356-57.
37. Id. at 357.
38. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969).
39. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961).
40. Id. at 427-28.
41. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969) (emphasis added).
42. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960).
43. Bennett, "'Mere" Rationality in Constitutional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67
CALIF. L. REV. 1049, 1057 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bennett].
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Owing to the Court's abdication, the rationality requirement for decades
became "largely inconsequential as a constraint on the power of govern-
ments." 44 There is no way to challenge a classification successfully if a court
is ready, willing, and eager to invent a means-end fit, even when the govern-
ment does not introduce evidence to rebut a challenger's prima facie case,
files no Brandeis brief, and does not articulate its ends.45 The Court in such
cases shirks its duty by supplying the missing end. It has become common-
place to note that the Court went from the extreme of inconsistent, un-
principled hyperactivism to the extreme of excessive deference. It failed to
establish "a halfway house between the extremes, retaining a measure of
control over economic legislation but exercising that control with discrimina-
tion and self-restraint. '" 46
To illustrate the challenger's insurmountable burden, suppose a statute
prohibits cigarette smokers from operating automobiles. If the Court assumes
the goal is traffic safety, the challenger could introduce statistics showing the
law is 99.9% overinclusive, but the "totally unrelated" standard literally
requires the challenger to show that the law is 100% overinclusive. Even if the
challenger could show that all nonsmokers are in fact more accident prone, he
or she will still lose the case because then the Court is free to hypothesize that
the legislature's goal is the prevention of litter. In short, as Professor Bennett
has said, the rationality requirement became "a convenient, if vacuous, label
that the Court could apply when it felt compelled to say something about why
legislation was constitutionally permissible., 47 At times, the Court did not
even bother to discuss means scrutiny" because the outcome was always
preordained.
In a thoughtful and influential article, 49 Professor Gunther encouraged
the Court to reconsider the approach of Justice Jackson, who regarded the
rationality requirement "as a salutary doctrine"' less intrusive than substan-
tive due process. Justice Jackson would scrutinize the challenged classifica-
tions to determine whether governments discriminated against their inhabi-
tants with "some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of the
regulation.", 5' Gunther sketches a model that once again "would view equal
protection as a means-focused, relatively narrow, preferred ground of
decision in a broad range of cases.", 52 The model would have courts determine
44. Perry, supra note 2, at 1070.
45. It is still an open question whether a court may dismiss an equal protection challenge "on the pleadings
or grant summary judgment for the state on the basis of the legislative history, without hearing the challenger's
evidence." Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 n.8 (1981).
46. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUP.
Cr. REV. 34, 41.
47. Bennett, supra note 43, at 1056.
48. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
49. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
50. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 112.
52. Gunther, supra note 49, at 20.
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under relatively vigorous scrutiny whether the challenged government clas-
sification had a "substantial relationship to legislative purposes." 53 The
model does not tolerate gross overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness,54 and
it demands a plausible fit between the classification and the articulated
purposes. Gunther realizes that the Court cannot meaningfully or intelligently
apply the rationality requirement if it continues to strain for any conceivable
justification for a challenged classification.5 His model therefore requires the
courts to "assess the rationality of the means in terms of the state's purposes,
rather than hypothesizing conceivable justifications on its own initiative."-
56
Moreover, there would be a greater burden on the state to come forth with
explanations indicating how the classification relates to the legislatively
chosen ends,57 together with "at least some evidence that the state [has]
thought about [its] rationale.",
58
In Vance v. Bradley,59 the Court chose to elaborate upon the nature of the
challenger's burden. Appellees had challenged section 632 of the Foreign
Service Act of 1946,"o which requires persons covered by the Foreign Service
retirement system to retire at age sixty. No similar mandatory retirement age
was established for Civil Service employees who serve abroad. The appellee
had the burden of demonstrating that Congress had no reasonable basis for
believing that (1) conditions overseas generally are more demanding than
those in this country, or that (2) no risks of less than superior performance are
incurred when persons over age sixty serve overseas in the foreign service.
The challengers did not shoulder their burden; reasonable persons could draw
different inferences from the evidence presented. Therefore, the classification
could not be deemed lacking in rationality. The Court explained that the
challenger would have to present evidence indicating that the legislative facts
forming the basis for the classification were so demonstrably unreliable that
no reasonable person could conceive them to be valid. 61 Although this is a
heavy burden indeed, Justice White, who wrote the Court's opinion, argued
in another case decided during the same term that other challengers had in
fact shouldered their burden of proof.62 The Court's current elaboration of the
challenger's burden does not seem at first blush to be much of a change from
the "totally unrelated" test, but the tone of the Court's message, as I under-
stand it, is that the challenger at least has an opportunity to prevail if he or she
has an exceptionally strong case. This is a different signal from that which had
been coming from the Court. The usual signal flashed by the Court in
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 33.
56. Id. at 46.
57. Id. at 44.
58. Id. at 45.
59. 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
60. 22 U.S.C. § 1002 (1976).
61. 440 U.S. 93, 110-12.
62. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 601-02 (1979) (White, J., dissenting).
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Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,63 McGowan v. Maryland,64 and McDonald v.
Board of Election Commissioners6 was that the Court is not interested in
reviewing social and economic legislation challenged on equal protection
grounds. The recent signal, however faint, is that the Equal Protection Clause
imposes a real constraint on legislative classifications.
The majority of the Justices on the Burger Court still often take a stance
more deferential than the Gunther model. New York City Transit Authority v.
Beazer66 illustrates the point. The transit authority refused to employ persons
attempting to break the heroin habit, and perhaps also those who had broken
the habit.67 Plaintiffs, who were successfully maintaining a methadone
program of rehabilitation, sued the authority and prevailed in the district
court. The district court judge found the transit authority could not have
reasonably concluded that successfully maintained methadone users are "less
employable than the general population" because many of the jobs
presented no safety risks. Justice White, dissenting, agreed with the lower
court judge that it was not rational to exclude every person in this group
without regard to job description.69 In some respects, Justice Powell also
agreed with the lower court's conclusion that "there is no rational basis for an
absolute bar against the employment of persons who have completed success-
fully a methadone maintenance program and who otherwise are qualified for
employment."
70
The Court, however, reversed the judgment for the plaintiffs and upheld
the overinclusive classification. Justice Stevens explained: "Because it does
not circumscribe a class of persons characterized by some unpopular trait or
affiliation, it does not create or reflect any special likelihood of bias on the
part of the ruling majority." 7' Thus, according to Beazer, the Court is persist-
ing in its policy of rubberstamping classifications unless a majority suspects
that owing to prejudice some politically powerless group is not getting a fair
shake from the political process. One should not conclude, however, that the
rationality requirement is forever frozen in the Beazer mold. Notions of equal
protection do change. 72 As the pressures increase to aid the mentally ill, the
handicapped, the aged, and other groups who are victims of stereotyping by
an unthinking ruling majority, there will be an incentive to adopt an across-
the-board rationality requirement with more bite. Otherwise, the sliding scale
that protects judicially selected minority groups will become too slippery to
63. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
64. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
65. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
66. 440 U.S. 568 (1979).
67. Id. at 572 n.3.
68. Id. at 606 (White, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 610-11.
70. Id. at 596-97 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. Id. at 593 (footnote omitted).
72. Cf. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ('Varren Court invalidated Virginia's
poll tax by invoking its "new" equal protection doctrine to secure the fundamental interest in voting).
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be credible. Moreover, someday the Court will awaken to the fact that it
cannot protect only those special groups which it perceives to be politically
weak and victimized. The purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to protect
all individuals and classes. If this were not so, only the perennial losers in the
political process would be entitled to meaningful equal protection of the laws.
Over a century ago, the Court realized that the Equal Protection Clause
means more; it "means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the
same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes-
in the same place and under like circumstances.'' 73
C. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. and the State
Court's Level of Scrutiny
Formulations of the rationality requirement, however phrased, raise but
do not answer the question whether a challenged legislative classification in
fact results in the disparate treatment of similarly situated persons. The ques-
tion often narrows to an appraisal of the sufficiency of the evidence that
supports the legislative facts. The distinction between the rationality require-
ment, a legal standard that relates to fit, and the proper method of applying
the rationality requirement to disputed facts is the subject of Justice Steven's
dissent in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.74
In Clover Leaf the Court upheld a Minnesota statute 75 designed, at least
in part, to preserve the environment and conserve energy. Justice Stevens, in
his dissenting opinion, drew a distinction between "the appropriate equal
protection standard" 76 and the empirical relationship between the legisla-
ture's classification and its purpose. In Clover Leaf, he would have deferred
to the state court's holding that the statute in fact discriminated irrationally in
violation of the federal Equal Protection Clause.77 He condoned the "state
judges' skeptical scrutiny"78 of the challenged statute, and argued that the
Court should defer to a state court that appraises the legislative facts without
deference to the state legislature. 79
The challenged statute prohibits the retail sale of milk in nonreturnable
plastic containers. Milk sold in paperboard cartons is unaffected.80 The
Minnesota Supreme Court properly recognized that "the relevant test is
whether the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest."
81
73. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879).
74. 449 U.S. 456, 477-89 (1981).
75. MINN. STAT. § 116 F.21 (West Supp. 1981).
76. 449 U.S. 456, 483 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 482-85.
78. Id. at 485 n.10.
79. "Of course, if a federal trial court had reviewed the factual basis for a state law, conflicts in the
evidence would have to be resolved in favor of the State. But when a state court has conducted the review, it is
not our business to disagree with the state tribunal's evaluation of the State's own lawmaking process." Id. at
482-84 (footnote omitted).
80. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, Minn. - , 289 N.W.2d 79, 81 (1979) (footnote
omitted), rev'd, 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
81. Id.
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It is clear, however, that the state court resolved conflicts in the evidence
against the state and substituted its judgment for that of the legislature.
Minnesota's highest court concluded, "[T]here is no significant difference
between plastic containers and paper containers. ' ' 2 The Supreme Court
reversed.
Justice Brennan wrote the opinion of the Court and stated:
[I]t is not the function of courts to substitute their evaluation of legislative facts for
that of the legislature.
We therefore conclude that the ban on plastic nonreturnable milk containers
bears a rational relation to the State's objectives, and must be sustained under the
Equal Protection Clause.
83
The Court's holding is not surprising. "[T]he Court ... simply determined
whether the state court's federal constitutional decision is 'correct,' meaning
in this context, whether it is the decision that the Supreme Court would inde-
pendently reach."I4 The general rule, articulated in Oregon v. Haas,5 is that a
state court may not impose greater restrictions on state officials "as a matter
of federal constitutional law when this Court specifically refrains from impos-
ing them."
8 6
Oregon v. Haas, however, did not deal with a state court's restrictions on
the state legislature.87 Justice Stevens therefore found "no support for [the
Court's] novel constitutional doctrine in either the language of the Federal
Constitution or the prior decisions of [the] Court.' ' n He objected to the
Court's interference with the relationship between the state legislatures and
state courts. He deemed it "extraordinary that this Federal Tribunal feels free
to conduct its own de novo review of a state legislative record in search of a
rational basis that the highest court of the State has expressly rejected." 9
82. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 485 n.10 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 470 (footnote omitted).
84. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1212, 1243 (1978) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Sager]. See also Bice, supra note 1. Professor Bice also
points out, quite correctly, that rationality analysis can be employed by state courts to review state legislation,
and that "considerations of federalism are not commonly involved." Id. at 42.
85. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
86. Id. at 719 (footnote omitted). Of course, as the Court pointed out, "'A state court may ... apply a more
stringent standard of review as a matter of state law under the State's equivalent to the Equal Protection or Due
Process Clauses." Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6 (1981).
87. The question presented was whether "a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater
restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional stand-
ards." Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975). In Professor Tribe's view, Oregon v. Haas was "wrongly
decided; the Constitution did not require a determinate interpretation in that case." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 32 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE]. Professor Tribe believes that "'the Constitution
creates-a process which on various occasions gives the Supreme Court, Congress, the President, or the States,
the last word in constitutional debate." Id. at 33. But see text accompanying notes 103-06 infra.
88. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 477 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens distinguished the following cases which the Court relied upon to rebut his thesis: Idaho Dept. of
Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100 (1977); County Bd. of Arlington v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5 (1977); Richardson
v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts, 410 U.S. 356 (1973). He distinguished
these as cases where the "Court concluded that the state court had applied an incorrect legal standard."
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 482 n.7 (1981).
89. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 482 (1981) (Stevens, I., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens was impressed with the evidence produced at trial "indicating
that the decision of the Minnesota Legislature was factually unsound,"90 and
with the findings and methodology of the trial judge who assumed "as fact-
finder [that he was] obliged to weigh and evaluate.., evidence, much of
which was in sharp conflict." 9' Justice Stevens did not deny, of course, that
"questions of constitutional power frequently turn ... on questions of
fact," 92 but he vigorously denied that the state courts are required to review
challenged legislative facts as if they were "cloaked with the presumption that
the legislature has acted within constitutional limitations." 93 Under the facts
and circumstances of Clover Leaf, it would appear that the extraordinary, if
not novel, views are those of Justice Stevens.
The state court's analysis of the challenged classification is reminiscent
of the Lochnerizing variety of means scrutiny at its zenith. For example, the
Minnesota Supreme Court, relying in part on the trial judge's findings and its
"own independent review of the documentary sources,"' determined that the
evidence of the state's expert witness was based on a "weak and inconclusive
foundation." 95 In the court's opinion, the expert's testimony "lacked con-
vincing quality.'' 96 Based on its appraisal of other controverted legislative
facts, the court found that "paper containers are not environmentally superior
to plastic refillables." 97 Although the Minnesota Supreme Court did not ques-
tion the legitimacy and importance of the legislature's purposes, it held that
"the Act, at best will not be a step toward amelioration of a perceived evil."-98
In short, the state court was acting as a super-legislature.
If state trial courts have power to review the factual basis for the state's
legislation without deference, this practice "makes it necessary for ajudge to
hear all the evidence offered as to why a legislature passed a law and to make
findings of fact as to the validity of those reasons. 99 An appraisal of disputed
legislative facts by a state court requires a "balancing of probabilities [that] is
not ... a matter for judicial determination, but one which calls for legislative
consideration." "' Each state, of course, is ordinarily free to prescribe "[t]he
functions that a state court shall perform within the structure of state govern-
ment,"'0 ' but it pushes the rationality requirement toward a reductio ad
90. Id. at 485 n.10.
91. Id. at 481 n.6.
92. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 229 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
93. Id. at 247.
94. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, -Minn.-, 289 N.W.2d 79,82 (1979), rev'd, 449 U.S.
456 (1981).
95. Id. at 83 (footnote omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 86.
98. Id.
99. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 794 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting) (Court
invalidated state law pursuant to negative implications of Commerce Clause).
100. Id.
101. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 481 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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absurdum if the Supreme Court is required to adopt state court reassess-
ments of the factual predicate for legislative action.
To be sure, the policy arguments in favor of greater state court enforce-
ment of underenforced norms and indeterminate norms have appeal.'02 But, it
is often forgotten by some proponents of stricter rationality analysis that the
Equal Protection Clause, as written and as originally understood and applied,
does not demand instrumental rationality. As Justice Linde writes:
[I]f the Constitution does not command legislatures in the act of legislating to go
through the kind of analysis that the proponents of rationality review demand of
courts "after the fact," then the legislature has not acted unconstitutionally when
its product is challenged for violating the Constitution. 103
I do not go as far as Justice Linde; conceptions of equal protection do
change.'14 But, the issue presented by Justice Stevens' dissent in Clover Leaf
is whether the Supreme Court of the United States must acquiesce when the
state courts change or ignore constitutional doctrine by eliminating the federal
courts' presumption of constitutionality.
It is argued by Professor Sager that the Equal Protection Clause is an
"underenforced norm," and that state courts, properly uninhibited by the
concerns of federalism and other institutional constraints on the federal
courts, should have more leeway to enforce the equality principle.'05 The
Equal Protection Clause, however, would not be an underenforced norm if
the federal courts meaningfully applied the rationality requirement. This is not
the case currently. Nevertheless, the failure of the federal courts creates no
power vacuum for the state courts to fill. As Justice Linde reminds us, the
rationality is a gloss added by the Supreme Court that was not demanded by the
framers of the fourteenth amendment.' 6
The ultimate issue is whether the challenged legislation requires correc-
tion owing to the legislature's normative and empirical errors. Because the
perspective and values of the state courts are likely to vary, the Supreme
Court's judgment ought to control. In sum, the balance between the benefits of
stricter state court enforcement of underenforced constitutional norms and the
advantages of nationwide uniformity ought to be struck in the final analysis by
the Supreme Court without extraordinary deference to the state courts.
This too must be said: A state court that acts pursuant to its duty to
interpret the self-executing aspects of the fourteenth amendment is acting as a
102. See generally TRIBE, supra note 87, at 27-33; Sager, supra note 84.
103. Personal letter from Justice Linde to Gary Leedes (March 16, 1981). See also Linde, supra note 2. Cf.
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 127 (1970) ("The Fourteenth Amendment was surely not intended to make
every discrimination between groups of people a constitutional denial of equal protection.") (Black, J., an-
nouncing opinion of Court and expressing his own view on constitutionality of 1970 Voting Rights Act amend-
ments).
104. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
105. See Sager, supra note 84.
106. See Linde, supra note 2; Personal letter from Justice Linde to Gary Leedes (March 16, 1981).
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constitutional court. It therefore must utilize a methodology consistent with
the Supreme Court's presumption of constitutionality for the challenged clas-
sification. This presumption entails deference to the legislature that enacted the
challenged classification, but the presumption does not mean that the facts
which provide the rational basis for the classification are true. The presumption
is that the legislature has not abused its discretion when it has reasoned from
the evidence to find legislative facts.0 7 The court should focus on the legislative
and trial record in order to determine whether the legislature arrived at its
conclusion by a process of reasoning from the evidence. The Court's rational-
ity requirement simply prevents judges from becoming mindless robots who
rubberstamp mindless discriminatory legislation. But, whatever bite the
Supreme Court's rationality requirement does or does not have at a given time,
it is binding on the states. It follows that the Court's presumption of constitu-
tionality, which in part pertains to the empirical component of the Court's
rationality requirement, has Supremacy Clause"ln ramifications, a constitu-
tional dimension that may not legitimately be ignored by state courts. The state
courts are agents without power to pursue frolics of their own unless ratified by
the Supreme Court's independent judgment."
The rationality requirement, as applied by the Supreme Court, is becoming
less perfunctory. As Professor Gunther has described this movement,
"Judicial deference to a broad range of conceivable legislative purposes and to
imaginable facts that might justify classifications is strikingly diminished.
Judicial tolerance of overinclusive and underinclusive classifications is notably
reduced.""' Although the Court in Clover Leaf quite properly upheld the
challenged classification, Justice Brennan's opinion indicates that he applied a
meaningful rationality requirement, neither too strict nor totally toothless. He
wrote:
States are not required to convince the courts of the correctness of their legislative
judgments. Rather, "those challenging the legislative judgment must convince the
court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could
not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker."
Although parties challenging legislation under the Equal Protection Clause
may introduce evidence supporting their claim that it is irrational, they cannot
prevail so long as "it is evident from all the considerations presented to [the
107. "'Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229
(1938). This statement of Chief Justice Hughes in a case involving judicial review of agency action "would
appear to have been derived from the test for sustaining a jury verdict." L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 596 (1965).
108. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
109. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). In this school desegregation case, the Court articulated a
broad definition of its power: 'Mhe federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitu-
tion." Id. The Court added, "'Every state legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly committed by
oath... 'to support this Constitution.' " Id.
!10. Gunther, supra note 49, at 20.
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legislature], and those of which we may take judicial notice, that the question is at
least debatable." Where there was evidence before the legislature reasonably
supporting the classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the legisla-
tion merely by tendering evidence in court that the legislature was mistaken."I
This deferential judicial attitude prevents legislatures from being turned into
mere conduits for the transmission of cases to the courts." 2 On the other
hand, Justice Brennan could be sending this signal: If the legislative record
indicates that there is no substantial evidence"3 supporting the legislative
determination, the Court may intervene and invalidate the legislation in
accordance with the rationality requirement.
D. United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz: An
Apparently Thoughtless Classification Survives
The debate among the Justices about the meaning of the rationality
requirement has been enlivened by the various opinions filed in United States
Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz."4 The Railroad Retirement Act of 1974115
fundamentally restructured the railroad retirement system in place under the
predecessor 1937 Act." 6 Under the new Act, as under the 1937 Act, some
employees are entitled to both social security and railroad retirement benefits.
Other employees under the new Act are not entitled to all the dual benefits
guaranteed under the old Act. For example, an unretired individual, as of
January 1, 1975, the changeover date, who had eleven years of railroad
employment is eligible for the dual benefit if he (1) qualified for social security
benefits, (2) worked for the railroad during 1974, or (3) had a "current connec-
tion" with the railroad as of December 31, 1974, or his later retirement date." 7
This class of unretired employees loses no vested benefits. On the other hand,
an unretired individual, as of January 1, 1975, who had twenty-four years of
railroad employment is ineligible for the dual benefits, even though qualified for
social security benefits, if he (1) had not worked for the railroad at least one day
111. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,464(1981) (citations omitted). Justice Brennan
admonished the state court to adhere to the federal test for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
legislative facts.
Whether in fact the Act will promote more environmentally desirable milk packaging is not the ques-
tion: the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied by our conclusion that the Minnesota Legislature could
rationally have decided that its ban on plastic nonreturnable milk jugs might foster greater use of
environmentally desirable alternatives.
Id. at 466. Justice Brennan made it clear that the Court's test applies whether the challengers assail "the
theoretical connection between a ban on plastic nonretumables and the purposes articulated by the legisla-
ture . . . [or the] empirical connection between the two." Id. at 463.
112. Accord, ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 91
(1941).
113. Formulas governing scope of review of legislative action are like rubber, not wood, and therefore
expand and contract like most other judicial doctrines. Federal courts today are taking a harder look at some
special cases of interest to them, but the delicacy of the undertaking requires the Supreme Court to keep a tight
rein not only on the federal district judges, but on state court judges as well.
114. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
115. 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231t (1976).
116. Ch. 382, 75 Stat. 307 (1937).
117. 449 U.S. 166, 171-72 (1980).
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during 1974, and (2) had no "current connection" with the railroad as of
December 31, 1974, or his later retirement date." 8 He loses some vested
retirement benefits. Summarizing the distinctions described above, Congress
comparatively disadvantaged a class of employees on the basis of their lack of
connection with the railroad as of 1974 or their later retirement date."9
The rationality requirement poses this question: Were dissimilarly
treated classes of employees similarly situated with reference to the purposes
of the Act? In addition to the primary goal of placing the railroads on a "sound
financial basis,"' 20 the purpose of the challenged distinction was to establish
"equitable retirement benefits for all railroad employees." How did the
classification relate to that purpose? The Court argued, without evidentiary
support in the legislative record, that Congress "could properly conclude that
persons who had actually acquired statutory entitlement to windfall benefits
while still employed in the railroad industry had a greater equitable claim"'1
22
and that persons who were not pursuing careers in the railroad, as of 1974,
were not members of "the class for whom the Railroad Retirement Act was
designed."" 2 The Court, citing Flemming v. Nestor,'24 maintained that it is,
"of course, 'constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact under-
lay the legislative decision.' " 25 Justice Rehnquist also added a footnote
reiterating the Court's new rationale for the old deference: "The Constitution
presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident deci-
sions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes and that judicial
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a
political branch has acted."'
' 26
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that "equal protection
analysis has evolved substantially ... since Flemming was decided."' 27 In
his view, the Court's current approach requires the government to justify the
rationality of the challenged classification, but when skeptical, the Court will
dig into the legislative history in order to discover "the actual purposes of
Congress." 28 Moreover, Brennan argued, the Court should not adopt a tautol-
ogical approach in its purpose inquiry in order to avoid "the necessity for
evaluating the relationship between the challenged classification and the legis-
lative purpose."' 129 Thus, the "Court will no longer sustain a challenged clas-
118. Id.
119. Id. at 196-97 n. 1l (Brennan, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 169.
121. Id. at 169 n.2.
122. Id. at 170.
123. Id.
124. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
125. 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612 (1960)).
126. Id. at 179 n.12 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
127. 449 U.S. 166, 187 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 186.
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sification under the rational basis test merely because government attorneys
can suggest a 'conceivable basis' upon which it might be thought rational.' ' a
Brennan often goes beyond the Gunther model, which was designed in part to
reduce judicial maneuverability and which does "not call for a delving into
actual legislative motivation."'' As a consequence, Justice Brennan con-
cluded that the classification was not "rationally related to achievement of an
actual legitimate governmental purpose."'
' 32
Justice Rehnquist replied that the Court's test, however the phraseology
may vary from case to case, is designed to prevent courts from imposing on
the government their views of what constitutes wise economic or social
policy, and that the problems of government justify rough, even illogical,
accommodations. 33 This stand-pat approach provoked Justice Stevens to file
a concurring opinion in which he wrote: "When Congress deprives a small
[group of their protected vested rights in order to benefit others] ... who are in
a similar though not identical position, I believe the Constitution requires
something more than merely a 'conceivable' or a 'plausible' explanation for the
unequal treatment. ''34 The problem, Justice Stevens continued, is that the
actual purpose of the legislature is sometimes unknown.' 35 Moreover, legisla-
tion is often the "product of multiple and somewhat inconsistent purposes
that led to certain compromises."' 136 Justice Stevens, in Fritz, was satisfied
that the method employed by Congress was reasoned and impartial, and that
the line, drawn on the basis of an employee's contacts with the railroad during
the year prior to the changeover date, was reasonable. 37
130. Id. at 188.
131. Gunther, supra note 49, at 46.
132. 449 U.S. 166, 188 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 174-76 (majority opinion). This debate between Justice Brennan and Justice Rehnquist, which
was joined by Justice Powell in Schweikerv. Wilson, 101 S. Ct. 1074, 1087-88(1981) (Powell, J., dissenting), see
text accompanying notes 146, 166-71 infra, has spilled over into areas of constitutional law outside the Equal
Protection Clause. In Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 101 S. Ct. 1309 (1981), Justice Brennan and
Justice Rehnquist continued their verbal joust in the context of asserted justifications for state law that arguably
burdens interstate commerce. In a footnote to his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan set forth his view:
The extent to which we may rely upon post hoc justifications of counsel depends on the circum-
stances surrounding passage of the legislation. Where there is no evidence bearing on the actual
purpose for a legislative classification, our analysis necessarily focuses on the suggestions of counsel.
Even then, "marginally more demanding scrutiny" is appropriate to "test the plausibility of the
tendered purpose." Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S. Ct. 1074, 1088 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting). But
where the lawmakers' purposes in enacting a statute are explicitly set forth, or are clearly discernible
from the legislative history, this Court should not take--and with the possible exception of United
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 183-84 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting), has
not taken-the extraordinary step of disregarding the actual purpose in favor of some "imaginary basis
or purpose." The principle of separation of powers requires, after all, that we defer to the elected
lawmakers' judgment as to the appropriate means to accomplish an end, not that we defer to
the arguments of lawyers.
Id. at 1322 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring) (some citations omitted). In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist posited that
"it is not clear the analysis of legislative purpose in [the equal protection] area is the same as in the [Commerce
Clause] context," id. at 1333 n. 13, but nevertheless devoted considerable energy to a rebuttal of Justice
Brennan's analysis. Id. at 1332-33.
134. 449 U.S. 166, 180 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 181.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 182.
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Several Justices appear to be moving away from an approach vividly
described by Professor Fiss in the following manner:
The court fixes the state's purpose by the process of imagination: only legitimate
purposes would be imagined, and the judge's mind would scan the universe of
legitimate purposes until he identified the legitimate state purpose that was best
served by the criterion, the one that left the smallest margins of over- and under-
inclusiveness. 13
8
The Court is citing McGowan 39 and McDonald'40 less frequently. 4'
Instead of inquiring whether the classification is "totally unrelated," there is
in the Court's recent phraseology, notwithstanding Justice Rehnquist's
views,'4 ' an increasingly strong indication that a classification is arbitrary if
"the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the
achievement of any combination of legislative purposes that we can only
conclude that the legislature's actions were irrational." 43 The most arrogant
legal scholar would not claim that this is a radical shift. However, the debate
in Fritz indicates that several Justices are reconsidering what for decades has
been a fiction: the desirability of a rationality requirement that demands
reasoned explanations justifying challenged classifications.
E. Schweiker v. Wilson: Justice Powell's Refinement of the Gunther Model
The most intriguing of all the equal protection cases decided during the
1980 Term is Schweiker v. Wilson.14 The dicta of the majority opinion are
fecund with possibilities that will benefit litigants who rely on the rationality
requirement.' 4s Moreover, the dissenting opinion of Justice Powell reveals
that at least four Justices will intensify the Court's level of scrutiny if the
legislature does not clearly identify the actual purposes that justify the chal-
lenged statutory classification. 46
The Supplemental Security Income program' 47 considered in Wilson is a
comprehensive federal program of minimal cash welfare benefits for the
indigent, blind, and disabled.4s A small comfort allowance of twenty-five
dollars per month is provided to otherwise eligible persons who reside in
public institutions, but "only if the qualified person resides in a public
hospital or institution that receives Medicaid funds on his behalf."' 49 No
138. Fiss, supra note 17, at 112.
139. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
140. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
141. Justice Rehnquist, for a change, did not cite McDonald or McGowan in his Fritz opinion, but he still
seems wedded to that toothless approach. But see Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Cruz v. Beto,
405 U.S. 319, 326 (1972).
142. 449 U.S. 166, 176 n.10 (1980).
143. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
144. 101 S. Ct. 1074 (1981).
145. See text accompanying notes 153-65 infra.
146. See text accompanying notes 164-66 infra.
147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1397f (1976).
148. S. REP. NO. 92-1230, at 4 (1972). See Schweiker v. Wilson, 101 S. Ct., 1074, 1077 (1981).
149. 101 S. Ct. 1074, 1086 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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comfort allowance "will be paid to an individual unless the form of institu-
tionalized treatment he receives is compensable under the separate Medicaid
program.' ' 150 Thus, "Congress made a distinction ... between residents in
public institutions receiving Medicaid funds for their care, and residents
in ... institutions not receiving Medicaid funds."' 51 Plaintiff-appellees in
Wilson were persons residing in public institutions who were ineligible for the
supplemental benefits.
52
The Court concluded that Congress did not violate the plaintiffs' rights to
equal protection by denying them the supplementary benefit. 53 Justice
Blackmun explained that
the decision to limit distribution of the monthly stipend to inmates of public
institutions who are receiving Medicaid funds "is rationally related to the legiti-
mate legislative desire to avoid spending federal resources on behalf of individuals
whose care and treatment are being fully provided for by state and local govern-
ment units" and "may be said to implement a congressional policy choice to
provide supplemental financial assistance for only those residents of public institu-
tions who already receive significant federal support in the form of Medicaid
coverage." 154
He also noted that "it was [not] irrational of Congress, in view of budgetary
constraints, to decide that it is the Medicaid recipients in public institutions
that are the most needy and the most deserving of the small monthly supple-
ment."'155
Significantly, the Court noted that the decision of Congress to exclude
those who received no Medicaid funds had been intentional and not
inadvertent. 56 In the Court's view, the exclusion "advances [an] identifiable
governmental objective."' 57 Although the legislative history showed the
158challenged exclusion was a deliberate choice by Congress, the Court relied
primarily on the brief of the government, which identified the governmental
objective. 59 This reliance on positions advanced by government attorneys is
consistent with the model of equal protection described by Professor
Gunther, 60 and the Court insisted that its minimal level of judicial scrutiny is
"not a toothless one."' 16' Although Justice Powell argued in dissent that the
Court was too deferential towards the Congress and should not have accepted
at face value the government attorneys' articulation of the congressional
purpose, 62 the Court's distinction between a deliberate choice by Congress
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1082 (majority opinion).
152. Id. at 1078.
153. Id. at 1085.
154. Id. at 1084.
155. Id. at 1085.
156. Id. at 1084.
157. Id. at 1083.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1084.
160. See generally Gunther, supra note 49.
161. 101 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 (1981) (quoting, Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)).
162. Id. at 1085 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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and one that is "the result of inadvertence or ignorance"'63 is crucial. This
distinction will almost surely spawn a new line of cases. The Court seems to
be signalling that it will no longer tolerate thoughtless classifications, and that
the government will have the burden not only to identify its objectives,' 64 but
to demonstrate that the objective articulated by the government attorneys is
consistent with a deliberate choice made by the legislature.165 This approach
should help courts reduce the risk of arbitrary classifications.
Although the Justices "continue to hold divergent views on the clarity
with which a legislative purpose must appear,"' 66 the requirement of an
identifiable legislative purpose is now more firmly established in the Court's
cases if Wilson is our guide. Justice Powell goes further than the majority. In
his view, "When a legislative purpose can be suggested only by the ingenuity
of a government lawyer litigating the constitutionality of a statute, a reviewing
court may be presented not so much with a legislative policy choice as its
absence." 67 In order to promote candor on the part of government attorneys
and to avoid rubberstamping legislation that fits some "fictional" post hoc
purpose articulated by counsel, Justice Powell would "require that the clas-
sification bear a 'fair and substantial relation' to the asserted purpose ... [to]
preserve equal protection review as something more than 'a mere tautological
recognition of the fact that Congress did what it intended to do.' " 6 In
typically understated fashion, Justice Powell utilized a footnote to discredit
Flemming'69 and McGowan17 as cases which "do not describe the impor-
tance of actual legislative purpose in our analysis" of Equal Protection Clause
challenges to statutory classifications.
17
The recent cases show the Court is still uncertain and adrift so far as the
rationality requirement is concerned because the Justices cannot reach a con-
sensus on how to formulate and apply the rational basis test. 72 Justice
Rehnquist still favors the Flemming approach, which amounts to excessive
deference. 73 Justice Brennan still engages in intrusive and not always dispas-
sionate ends analysis, which is reminiscent of selective Lochnerizing on
behalf of certain powerless groups. 174 Since a new Justice has been
appointed to the Supreme Court, the future cannot be predicted by this
163. Id. at 1084 (majority opinion).
164. The majority opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, like Justice Powell's dissent, insisted that "the
classificatory scheme chosen by Congress [must be one] that rationally advances a reasonable and identifiable
governmental objective .... ." Id. at 1083 (emphasis added).
165. -'[The decision to incorporate the Medicaid eligibility standards into the Supplemental Security
Income scheme must be considered Congress' deliberate, considered choice." Id.
166. Id. at 1087 n.4 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 1088.
168. Id.
169. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
170. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
171. 101 S. Ct. 1074, 1088 n.6 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1087 n.4.
173. See text accompanying notes 120-26 supra.
174. See text accompanying notes 127-32 supra.
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commentator. Yet, Justice Powell's dissent in Wilson could provide the basis
for a consensus in the near future.
Justice Powell's approach'75 is a refinement of the Gunther model.
It places the burden on the government to articulate its purposes so
that the issues are narrowed and the challenger's burden of proof is realistic
and surmountable. Justice Powell applies a fair and substantial relationship
test when the legislature does not articulate its purposes, lessening the likeli-
hood that the government will prevail simply because its attorney attributes to
a classification the permissible purpose that best explains it, 76 a purpose that
could be tautological or based on considerations that the legislature obviously
did not consider. The problem with Justice Powell's approach is his insistence
on applying the rationality requirement in situations where it should be inap-
plicable. For example, if the Congress favored some Medicaid recipients over
otherwise identically situated disabled indigents simply because it believed
one group of Medicaid recipients more deserving than another, the legisla-
ture's sense of fitness is not necessarily amenable to the rationality require-
ment. There are some distinctions reflecting the legislature's biases and
preferences that ought to be upheld by the Court.
II. ToWARDS A REALISTIC ENDS SCRUTINY IN EQUAL PROTECTION CASES
Several problems associated with the rationality requirement are of grave
concern to a Court that, by and large, is properly uninterested in imposing
upon government its views as to what constitutes wise economic or social
policy. Perhaps the greatest problem is "to avoid a disguised examination of
legislative ends" 'n inevitably leading to an evaluation of the importance of
the government's ends. In the years since Gunther has published his article
calling for "new bite for the old equal protection,"' 7 8 many thoughtful com-
mentators have pointed out just how formidable the Court's "ends inquiry"
problems are.'79 In this section I will discuss some of those difficulties.
The government rarely identifies its ends with adequate specificity.
Moreover, the legislature does not always fully appreciate which ends its
classifications serve beyond some vague conception that it is necessary to draw
a line. Drawing a line is an administrative convenience; the consequences of
drawing it at one place rather than another are not always carefully con-
sidered. The point of least resistance from the electorate may be the determi-
nant-that is, the legislature yields to the pressures applied by various groups
interested in the line drawing. In less polite terms, the legislature shows
favoritism toward the benefitted class and indifference or antipathy toward
175. See text accompanying notes 167-71 supra.
176. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 127 n.* (1930).
177. Gunther, supra note 49, at 48.
178. Id. at 20.
179. See, e.g., Linde, supra note 2.
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the disadvantaged class. No legislature can be consistently impartial, and
representatives are not elected to be impartial.80
Although it imposes limits on the legislature's discretion to draw lines,
the rationality requirement does not ordinarily limit the legislature's power to
govern. So long as a statute does not impermissibly invade an area of
governance beyond the legislature's power, 8' the representatives have wide
discretion to draw lines where they please. It is a common misconception that
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the legislature from being partial. For
example, Justice Stevens, concurring in Fritz, warned that "[i]f the adverse
impact on the disfavored class is an apparent aim of the legislature, its impar-
tiality would be suspect." ' 82 Justice Stevens implies that if the Court's sus-
picions of bias were confirmed, the classification would violate the Equal
Protection Clause. 83 This position is unrealistic and Professor Posner ex-
plains why.' 4
Professor Posner has observed that although the Court's "expressed
view ... is that the political process is one of honestly attempting to promote
efficiency, or justice, or some other equally general conception of the public
good,"' 85 the expressed view is a fig leaf concealing a "pure power strug-
gle... among narrow interests and/or pressure groups."' 86 Posner also
observed that many interests and groups obtain favorable legislation owing to
their "money, votes, cohesiveness, [and] ability to make credible threats of
violence or other disorder."' 87 In short, most statutes are not consciously
enacted in the public interest and it is unrealistic for the Court to insist they
are. 88 Posner's argument strikes the intellect. Most legislation is the product
180. Learned Hand wrote:
In theory, any statute is always open to challenge on the ground that it was not in truth the result of an
impartial effort, but from the outset it was seen that any such inquiry was almost always practically
impossible, and moreover, it would be to the last degree political.
L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 67 (1958).
181. The legislature's power quite obviously is limited, for example, by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (no bill
of attainder), art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (no title of nobility shall be granted), art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (negative implications of the
Commerce Clause), art. IV, § 2 (privileges clause), the Bill of Rights, and substantive due process principles.
182. United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 181-82. See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-14 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
184. Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities,
1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
185. Id. at 27.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 27-3 1. A recent article in Harper's magazine, which analyzed the problem of budget cutting,
corroborates the point. Tom Bethell wrote:
As David Stockman pointed out... legislators can win votes and friends by taking away a penny from
everyone and handing out a dollar to a select few. Stockman called this the "social pork barrel." The
few will be duly grateful and will remember their representatives on election day. The rest won't miss
the penny. To realize how inexorably ratchet-like this process becomes, imagine trying to reverse it,
taking back the dollar and resorting the pennies. Multiply this mechanism across the hundreds of
special-interest groups that have built up over fifty years-all trying to qualify for their own share of
handouts-and you can appreciate the momentum of federal spending.
HARPER'S, May, 1981, at 23. The rationality requirement is often ill-suited as ajudicial technique calculated to
reverse this "ratchet-like process." Ronald Dworkin writes:
It is unrealistic to think that individual legislators decide how to vote by measuring the programmes
submitted to them against Benthamite conceptions of the general good, deciding on nice calculations
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of a politically successful coalition that seeks to advance its own material and
ideological interests. Can this be an end prohibited by the Equal Protection
Clause? The courts, to the extent they tackle the subject, indicate that this
kind of favoritism is indeed prohibited. Bennett reads the precedent correctly
when he declares that "unalloyed personal favor is beyond the present legisla-
tive pale." 8 9 John Hart Ely also argues that the government may not bestow
favors simply because it likes or dislikes persons or classes.' 9 These aspira-
tions are consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitu-
tion. For example, Chief Justice Taft declared in Truax v. Corrigan9' that the
equal protection "guaranty was aimed at undue favor and individual or class
privilege, on the one hand, and at hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality, on the other."' 92
how far to pursue one strategy, and when to leave it off in favour of another. The institution of
representative democracy is an imperfect machine for pursuing the general welfare; it works to the
degree it does, as a kind of black box, in which various sorts of political pressures compete, so that (if
the community is lucky) an invisible hand will produce an approximation of the general good over the
long run....
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 323-24 (1978).
189. Bennett, supra note 43, at 1083.
190. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 137 (1980). I would agree that favoritism and antipathy deny
equal protection of the laws if law enforcement officers and administrators single out individuals on the basis of
their likes or dislikes, but this manifestation of bias is not intended by the legislature. Thus, such discrimination
is literally a denial of equal protection of the laws. On the other hand, even Professor Ely cannot deny the
"concentrations of power, and inequalities among the various competing [interest] groups in American
politics." Id. at 135. My point, contrary to Ely's thesis, is that favoritism towards the more powerful groups by
elected representatives is not necessarily an indication that the political process is malfunctioning. As Justice
Powell has written, "Congress is not an adjudicatory body called upon to resolve specific disputes between
competing adversaries. Its constitutional role is to be representative rather than impartial, to make policy rather
than to apply settled principles of law." Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448, 502 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
Too many judges and commentators confuse legal bias, which disqualifies judges and some officials of adminis-
trative agencies, see Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 448 U.S. 238, 247 (1980) (biasing influence does not disqualify a
decisionmaker who performs no judicial or quasi-judicial functions), with the legitimate biases of elected
representatives in the legislatures who aim to please their constituents, whether their constituents be those
favored by the Black Caucus, as was the case with the "minority business enterprise provision" in § 103(f)(2) of
the Public Works Employment Act of 1977,42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2), see Fullilove v. Klutznik, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting), or the "rich" oil companies. At times, a Supreme Court Justice will recognize this fact
of life. For example, Justice Blackmun in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978),
wrote: "It is worth noting, perhaps, that governmental preference has not been a stranger to our legal life. We
see it in the veterans' preferences. We see it in the aid to the handicapped programs. We see it in the progressive
income tax. We see it in the Indian programs." Justice Blackmun approved of these preferences.
What is unrepublican about a legislature that favors an economic or cultural special interest group? It is
often inappropriate for courts to require legislatures to ignore groups who successfully exert extra effort to
influence legislation. This effort may take various forms: speeches, protests, votes, formation of coalitions, and
campaign contributions. This is what the political process is all about. It would seem that when the legislature
favors one faction over another because of the influence they have brought to bear, the question presented to a
court is usually political and not a constitutional question. Officials, after all, are often elected because the
electorate likes them and dislikes their opponents. It is only natural-not unconstitutional--that the elected
officials will reciprocate and like or favor some of their constituents over and above others.
191. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
192. Id. at 332-33. Justice iaft's statement is unrealistically overbroad. Statements of this genre overlook
the fact that legislators, like judges, have their own "can't helps." Thus, a legislature may favor the dam builder
over the snail darter, the conglomerate over the environmentalist, and this group over that group. One legisla-
ture may favor the fetus over the physical or mental health of the pregnant female. Another legislature, at a
different time and place, may favor the pregnant female. But the legislators' preference of one being over the
other in this and in many other zero sum games may depend on conventional morality-values, not legislative or
adjudicative facts, are often dispositive. The dispositive value choice reflects the representative's choice of
RATIONALITY REQUIREMENT
Because the Court indicates that both antipathy and pure favoritism are
ends always prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause, legislatures conceal
their true aims with respectable figleaves, government attorneys often lack
candor, and courts often can scan the universe for some hypothetical impar-
tial end the legislature may never have considered. This scanning technique
appears to eliminate the ends inquiry difficulty, but a court obviously de-
ceives itself and the public when it holds that the health, safety, and general
welfare are intended to be furthered by a statute that was actually enacted for
reasons unrelated to these ends. The mirage is necessary only because the
Court's list of permissible ends does not include favoritism or antipathy. It is
my contention that the Court's notions of impermissible ends are too strict,
counterproductive, and unnecessary.
When the legislature decides to benefit one group over another, it fre-
quently regards the traits of the benefitted group as equal to-or better than-
the group that is comparatively disadvantaged. In our pluralistic society
(known for a substantial amount of ethical relativism), the correctness of
moral judgment is not deemed to be a matter of knowledge or truth. Rather, it
is acknowledged that moral judgment often reflects tastes, feelings, condition-
ing, social conventions, or some other noncognitive basis for decision.
Reasons of course should be given, whenever feasible, by those defending
challenged legislative classification. But the ultimate reason underlying a
challenged classification is frequently a moral judgment based on sentiment,
passion, or some other predisposition of will. Until the Supreme Court identi-
fies a universal moral principle under which intermediate principles of the
Equal Protection Clause can be plausibly subsumed, 93 one that negatives the
power of the legislatures to make moral judgments about groups, the Court's
strictures against favoritism and antipathy are unrealistic demands of dubious
validity. A human being does not by election to the legislature lose his or
her affective nature.
There is, of course, an obvious exception to any rule of constitutional law
that condones legislative hostility. The Equal Protection Clause was and is
intended to eliminate hostile and stigmatizing racial discrimination. The
priorities or his sense of appropriateness. However objectionable the choice of priorities is to a minority faction,
the Constitution, in my view, does not prohibit this kind of "'visceral" favoritism. Nor does it prohibit the
partiality, perhaps hostility, of budget cutters, for example, who want, in their words, to "end handouts to those
blankety-blank loafers on the dole." At bottom, the legislator's likes and dislikes reflect conditions of their
minds, their moral principles, their tastes and, if you will, their druthers. This type of legislature preference is
not amenable to ajudicially imposed rationality requirement because the preference is obviously arbitrary, but
since representatives, like the rest of us, are not entirely rational when it comes to basic urges, it is a lesser evil
to trust the basic urges of the representative who has to stand for re-election than trust the judge who infre-
quently, if ever, runs for office.
Man is not entirely rational, and neither are legislators who sometimes enact into law their more primitive,
unconscious urges, which cannot always be evaluated by the rationality requirement. It does not follow that
such legislation is unconstitutional.
193. See generally A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY (1978); see also N. MACCORiMICK, LEGAL
REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 3-7, 288-92 (1978).
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guaranty was primarily designed to protect freed slaves from the oppression
of inequality. In the Slaughter-House Cases,'94 Justice Miller simply reiter-
ated the common view of the day when he said, "We doubt very much
whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination against
the negroes... will ever be held to come within the purview of this provi-
sion."' 95 The Court has properly enlarged the ambit of the Equal Protection
Clause, and it is today's common view that the Clause protects each person
(and corporation) within the jurisdiction of the United States.
Although the Court should protect all individuals and groups from clas-
sifications that violate the rationality requirement, it should not be preoc-
cupied with either unalloyed favoritism or antipathy.9 6 The legislature may
choose to be hostile towards burglars, pornographers, polluters of the envi-
ronment, and people who let their barking dogs out in the midnight air. The
legislature is empowered to enact into law the electorate's likes and dislikes.
So far as the Equal Protection Clause is concerned, the legislature may be
hostile towards anyone who violates the conventions of the day. It therefore
may be hostile towards gamblers, unions, oil companies, hippie communes
were it not for the first amendment, and even towards opticians, 97 funeral
directors who sell insurance, and females desiring abortions,' particularly
when hostility is the inevitable sequel of favoritism towards opthalmologists,
insurance lobbies, and those who desire to have children instead of abortions.
Why? Because, as noted, the primary evil to be eradicated by the Equal
Protection Clause was racism and, more to the point of this Article, because
the legislature's antagonism may have a basis in the conventions of the day.
The Court's knee-jerk reaction to hostility, which it labels an impermis-
sible end, is counterproductive because as a result, all classes and persons,
except the few the Court chooses to protect specially, have virtually no
protection from overinclusive and underinclusive laws. If the rationality
requirement were applied across the board with relatively vigorous means
scrutiny, there would be a greater likelihood that all classes and persons,
including Mr. Fritz, 200 could be protected by the courts from thoughtless
classifications. Currently, however, there is no meaningful protection owing
to the Supreme Court's idealistic notions of impermissible ends. Too many
194. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
195. Id. at 81.
196. Justice Stevens has expressed his agreement with Professor Cox's recent observation that "in the final
analysis, 'the Court is always deciding whether in its judgment the harm done to the disadvantaged class by the
legislative classification is disproportionate to the public purposes the measure is likely to achieve.'" Cox
Book Review, 94 HARV. L. REV. 700, 706 (1981), quoted in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County,
101 S. Ct. 1200, 1218 n.4 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
198. Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
199. Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980) (Government action "encouraging childbirth except in
the most urgent circumstances is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting
potential life.").
200. See text accompanying notes 114-43 supra.
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statutes that are enacted in the mode that Posner describes would be invali-
dated if the Court's ideals were strictly enforced. 20 ' This prospect tempts the
Court to weaken the rationality requirement by implausibly discerning ends
that are neither overinclusive nor underinclusive.
A revenue raising statute that taxes cigarettes and not milk may further
health-related concerns, but a healthy society is hardly the sole objective
furthered by the differential treatment. Otherwise, tobacco farmers would not
get subsidies. 2 2 Politics, not instrumental rationality, explains these trade-
offs. The Court almost always evades addressing the realpolitik observations
of Posner. But the Court is hoist by its own petard. Were it not for its disdain
for favoritism and antipathy, the issue would be whether the state's articu-
lated justification for the law is arbitrary. As matters now stand, equal protec-
tion for those groups not specially protected by the Court is the dreaded "last
resort of constitutional arguments., 20 3 The irony is exquisite: because the
Court asks of the Equal Protection Clause more than it can bear, it has
become barren.
Suppose the Court realizes the self-defeating nature of its ends-oriented,
minimum rationality approach, and holds that hostility and favoritism are not
per se impermissible ends. More specifically, suppose the Court upholds a
law that it suspects favors the insurance lobby.2° What would happen
if the Court is candid? Funeral directors would still be prevented from selling
insurance and, if the people demand reform, it will come from the political
process. I believe this outcome is healthier in a democratic republic than a
pretext of impartiality that distorts the political process and conceals from the
voters information that is relevant at election time. If, as the Court explains,
minimum rationality has no bite because those who have political power can
reform the system, °5 the Court should not conceal how the political system
works.
Government attorneys and legislators who fear reprisals from the
electorate will, no doubt, frequently continue to disguise their true aims, but
the Court will no longer be a party to the conspiracy. The Court, by refusing
to acknowledge that many laws are the product of favoritism and antipathy,
has become an apologist for those who, owing to their money, votes,
cohesiveness, and ability to make threats credible, obtain favorable legisla-
tion.
Posner's realpolitik argument can be turned around. In fact, Justice
Linde turned it around when he argued that the futility of discerning the real
201. See text accompanying notes 184-88 supra.
202. Commodity Credit Corporation loans to the tobacco program from 1953 to 1981 have cost the federal
government nearly $600 million dollars. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Mar. II, 1981, § C, at 10, col. 1.
203. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 202 (1927).
204. See Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
205. United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 n.12 (1980); Vance v. Bradley, 440
U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
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ends of a legislature2°6 makes the rationality requirement "illusory." 2 7 It is
necessary to discuss Linde's views in more detail because he has launched a
most penetrating attack on the rationality of the rationality requirement.
Linde states accurately that the rationality requirement takes an
"instrumentalist view of the law. "2° He thinks that it is a mistake for courts
to apply the formula "that legislative means must substantially further legisla-
tive ends." 209 All laws serve some purpose, 2 '0 he argues, but it is impossible
for a judge to determine which purposes are intended to be furthered 2 1 ' He
explains that "a law, even at the time it is enacted, is rarely meant to achieve
one goal at the sacrifice of all others." 212 To ascertain the multiple and some-
times inconsistent purposes of the legislature, the Court is obliged to search
for all the legislative ends--the very issue that means-centered review is
intended to avoid., 21 3 Moreover, as Linde trenchantly observes, laws some-
times express a legislature's "sense of the fitness of things" rather than "an
instrumental aim., 214 In other words, if the legislature decides to prohibit
females from practicing law owing to its sense of what ought to be, Linde
would assert that the real issue is the legitimacy of the action taken-in this
instance, the classification.2 15
I agree with Justice Linde that when the legislature asserts that its
purpose is simply to achieve its sense of what ought to be, this objective is not
necessarily impermissible. But government attorneys or some other appro-
priate surrogate for the legislature should be required to articulate what
reasons support the legislature's sense of the fitness of a challenged discrimi-
nation.21 6 If the government attorneys respond that the legislature has an
antipathy towards females practicing law, the Court is entitled to ask what
reasons have engendered antipathy towards females in this context. If, by
chance, the government attorneys respond that the legislature reacted to
206. Linde, supra note 2, at 212.
207. Id. at 201-15, 220-35, 251-55.
208. Id. at 204.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 205.
211. Id. at 212, 233-35. In Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981), Justice
Rehnquist writes:
This Court has long recognized that "inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous
matter," and the search for an "actual" or "primary" purpose of a statute is likely to be elusive. Here,
for example, [referring to gender based statutory rape law], individual legislators may have voted for
the statute for a variety of reasons ....
The justification for the statute offered by the State, and accepted by the Supreme Court of
California, is that the legislature sought to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancies. That finding, of
course, is entitled to great deference. And although our cases establish that the State's asserted reason
for the enactment of a statute may be rejected, "if it could not have been a goal of the legislation," this
is not such a case.
Id. at 1204-05 (citations omitted).
212. Linde, supra note 2 at 208.
213. Id. at 209.
214. Id. at 211.
215. Id. at 212. Linde's article focuses on the rationality requirement of the Due Process Clause.
216. See text accompanying notes 49-58 supra.
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pressures applied by the male legal fraternity, the plaintiff loses. The classifi-
cation is closely related to the legislature's aim, and the plaintiff and others
should endeavor to undo the legislature's favoritism by political action.
From the foregoing, it follows that the problem of ascertaining ends is
ameliorated for purposes of a lawsuit if government attorneys or some other
surrogate of the legislature is required by the Court to identify the ends and
reasons-few or many-that they believe justify the challenged law. More-
over, the ends inquiry problem becomes more manageable if the Court
requires the government to produce some evidence indicating the legislature
at least thought about the rationale articulated by the attorneys. Linde, how-
ever, deprecates the suggestion that counsel should have the power to speak
for the legislature. He asks rhetorically, "Is it not curious that the fate of an
act of the legislature should hang on the capacity and willingness of the
government's lawyer, and sometimes of a private party, to phrase the law's
objectives so that neither they nor the chosen means are vulnerable to consti-
tutional attack?
' 217
My response to Linde's question is this: The fate of an act of the legisla-
ture should not depend on the Court's willingness to participate in a sham.
There is simply no reason why the Court should cover for the legislature's
failure to think things out, nor is there a sound reason why courts should, on
their own initiative, explain that a law enacted to serve the interests of pres-
sure groups is a health-related or consumer protection measure. Therefore, a
requirement compelling government attorneys to do their best2'8 by explain-
ing the rationale for the law's application to the plaintiff-while it may not
necessarily promote candor in the government attorney's office-will
promote candor on the Court.21 9
Linde is on firm ground, however, when he argues that the rationality
requirement will not always be efficacious or applicable.2 0 If the legislature
desires to encourage or favor symphony orchestras because the lawmakers
221like music or musicians, the question becomes one of aesthetics. In such
217. Linde, supra note 2, at 213.
218. -[A] main difficulty with reviewing laws for rationality is the problem of time; that is, the time at
which the law must be a rational means to an end in order to be constitutional." Id. at 215. I would argue,
contrary to Linde, that a law must be rational at the time it is enforced, id. at 216, and no one knows better than
the law enforcement officers or those who administer the law why it is being enforced. The government
attorneys therefore may speak for them.
219. When the traditional materials used for statutory construction are uninformative in cases not involving
alleged racial discrimination, the Court ought to accept the government attorneys' articulation of the legislative
goals. Otherwise the temptation to manipulate the conceivable legislative ends will often prove irresistible.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), is a classic example of such manipulation. Of course, if the attorneys'
representations are patently false, the Court need not accept their articulation of purposes at face value. But see
Fiss, supra note 17, at 113: "This hypothesis seems to me to posit a somewhat naive conception of the state
process.... [As a result], the stated-purpose requirement has not taken root, and probably should not be
viewed as an important or permanent feature [of the rationality requirement]." Moreover, as noted in Michael
M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981), the Court's cases "establish that the State's
asserted reason for the enactment of a statute may be rejected 'if it could not have been a goal of the legisla-
tion.' " Id. at 1205 (citation omitted).
220. Linde, supra note 2, at 205.
221. See also Ely, Legislation and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L. J. 1205,
1230, 1247 (1970).
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situations, a challenger usually cannot demonstrate through the introduction
of empirical evidence that the classification is not related to aesthetics. More-
over, the legislature ordinarily ought to be permitted to further its conception
of aesthetics one step at a time.
There are other traits that are morally or ethically, rather than instrumen-
tally, relevant. It may be difficult to rationalize why, for example, those who
advertise for hire have less of an ethical claim for an exemption from a traffic
safety regulation than those who advertise their own goods.m2 Not all
customs, mores, and folkways are instrumental, nor are they necessarily
unconstitutional. Linde is correct, therefore, when he argues that there are
unpragmatic, non-purposive values not amenable to the model of the ration-
ality requirement, 2' but neither he nor the Court should throw out the baby
with the bath water by ignoring the rationality requirement in those cases in
which it is surely applicable.
My argument is based on the premise that the challenger in an equal
protection case should have his or her day in court. The rationality require-
ment should be reconsidered in order not to make that day a futile ritual. The
plaintiff must, of course, claim that the government's distinction is disad-
vantageous and that he or she falls on the disadvantaged side of the line. The
government should move to dismiss if it can argue that the rationality
requirement is inapplicable because the line drawn is the inevitable result of
random choice or bias. The pure issue of law presented by the pleadings
would be whether, under the facts and circumstances, the legislature is en-
titled to be arbitrary. Such cases can be imagined. In a related vein, Ely has
noted that the "promotion of 'good taste' . . . cannot be evaluated by a
calculus of 'rationality' and 'irrationality.' 2 2 4 The Court, accordingly, should
grant the government's motion to dismiss if it is convinced that the line drawn
simply reflects the legislature's partiality and is not amenable to evaluation by
a rationality test.
There are other cases where the state of the art is too primitive to support
a legislative judgment with empirical data. Decision making must therefore
depend to a great extent upon policy judgments and less upon purely factual
analysis. In situations involving, for example, "the frontiers of scientific
222. Cf. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). "iMhere is a real difference
between doing in self-interest and doing for hire, so that it is one thing to tolerate action from those who act on
their own and it is another thing to permit the same action to be promoted for a price." Id. at 116 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981), a city ordinance that was
challenged on the grounds that it abridged freedom of speech survived judicial scrutiny. The Court held that
restrictions that distinguished between an owner's on-site billboard advertising and other, more distracting
billboard advertising directly advanced the city's interests in aesthetics and traffic safety. Id. at 2899.
223. Linde, supra note 2, at 221. To say, as Justice White did recently, that a property owner has a stronger
interest in on-site advertising, as opposed to off-site advertising, is unconvincing, see Metromedia, Inc. v. City
of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2895 (1981); to say on-site advertising is morally less objectionable, however,
places the issue in its proper analytical framework.
224. Ely, Legislation and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L. J. 1205, 1237
(1970).
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knowledge," 22 the government should "so state and go on to identify the
considerations [it finds] persuasive."226 If the Court is convinced that the
policy issue is purely discretionary and the exercise of discretion is within the
227power of the government, the challenger loses. Moreover, when the legisla-
ture is allocating scarce resources and budget cuts have to be made, it may be
more or less sympathetic towards some programs. Legislators may not be
able to articulate their reasons beyond instinctual urges. Representatives may
favor some programs and have antipathy towards others for no reason other
than notions that the favored programs redound more to their intuitive con-
ception of a proper governmental role. The rationality requirement is inappli-
cable under such circumstances. The remedy, if any, must be political and not
judicial. There are many other situations where a relatively vigorous, means-
focused rationality requirement is inapplicable.
Fritz 22 is an example of how unhelpful the Supreme Court's current
approach is. The classification assailed by Fritz was the brainchild of a com-
mission. 229 The members of this commission were not appointed by public
officials, nor did they represent the interests of the challengers who were no
longer active railroaders or union members.2 0 The classification upheld by
the Court was arguably not closely related to the stated purpose of Con-
gress-to establish equitable retirement benefits for all railroad em-
ployees 23 -and nothing in the record indicates Congress gave any thought to
the line drawn by the commission. 2 Nevertheless, the Court presumed that
Congress made a rational policy judgment based on the time bound line drawn
by the commission. 3 The Court simply assumed that Congress drew the line
excluding individuals with many years of railroad service on the premise that
they were not "among the class of persons who pursue careers in the railroad
industry," 234 an assumption that was based solely on their lack of affiliation
with the railroad in 1974 or thereafter. If Congress made any judgment at all, it
was not a rational one in the instrumental sense. It therefore appears that the
Court bailed Congress out of this botched job by supplying the government
with a figleaf that disguised the legislature's thoughtlessness.
Individuals and classes protected by the Equal Protection Clause deserve
more candor. Justice Rehnquist could have explained in his opinion in Fritz
that his premise was based solely on the representations of government
attorneys. If nothing else, this publicity in the United States Reports will
cause government attorneys to think twice about making representations to
225, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
226. Id. at 476.
227. Accord, Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 428 (1974).
228. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
229. Id. at 189-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 169 n.2.
232. Id. at 191-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
233. Id. at 460-61.
234. Id. at 461.
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the Court that are not only figleaves, but also figments of their imaginations
and obstructions of justice. Nor would it be an intrusive interference with
congressional prerogatives for the courts to require evidence that the
rationale proffered by government attorneys was actually considered by
Congress. If such evidence is not forthcoming, the classification could be
deemed arbitrary, not because the Court disagrees with the wisdom of the
classification, but because Congress inadvertently enacted a law that does not
reflect reasoned judgment. That is what the rationality require-
ment is all about.235 It is not a cure-all, nor should it be a placebo. It
should protect persons and classes from arbitrary, disadvantageous distinc-
tions without disabling the government from acting in an area in which it has
power to act.
CONCLUSION
The Equal Protection Clause protects all persons and classes, and the
rationality requirement, whenever applicable, should be applied with rela-
tively vigorous means-focused scrutiny. Meaningful judicial scrutiny is un-
likely to occur if the Court continues to scan the universe for imaginary ends
in order to avoid (1) the difficulties of ends scrutiny, and (2) the political
problems which would ensue if it held invalid the numerous laws that are
enacted owing to favoritism and antipathy.
Recent signals from four of the Justices indicate that the legislature's
articulated, if not its actual, purpose, rather than judicial hypothesizing, will
count.236 This is a welcome development. The rationality requirement is a test
that cannot function well if the Court does not, to the extent feasible, require a
showing that the legislative body (1) was aware of what action it took, (2)
intended to take that action in the sense of envisaging it, and (3) wanted the
action to be taken either for its own sake or for the sake of achieving some
stated objective, or both. 37 The Equal Protection Clause cannot fulfill its
promise of reducing the risk of arbitrary classifications unless the Court ana-
lyzes the manifestations, if any, of the legislature's selective attention towards
the probable effects of its classification.
Although several Justices appear to be reconsidering the desirability of the
Gunther model as a useful judicial technique in a wider range of cases, the
majority still often acts as if it were following Justice Linde's advice to abandon
235. See Gunther, supra note 49, at 20: "Stated most simply, it would have the Court take seriously a
constiutional requirement that has never been formally abandoned: that legislative means must substantially
further legislative ends."
236. For Gunther's discussion of 1980 Term equal protection cases with a focus on the divisions among the
Justices concerning actual, articulated and hypothesized ends, see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 53-72 (10th ed. Supp. 1981).
237. For a similar methodological model bearing on the way moral judgments, in general, are connected
with action, see A. GEWIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 37-42 (1978).
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the rationality requirement. For example, in Fritz, Justice Rehnquist seemed
unconcerned with whether his justification for the legislative line drawing in
fact influenced an indifferent Congress. 8 To the extent that the Court has not
found the key to the halfway house between excessive deference and un-
warranted interference with legislative discretion, it continues to deny many
people the equal protection of the laws. When the government uses classifica-
tions, the public is entitled to a reasoned explanation justifying the discrimina-
tion.
238. 449 U.S. 166, 166-79 (1980).

